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 HUMAN STUDIES 4, 165-178(1981)
 Solipsistic and Intersubjective
 Phenomenology1
 Peter Hutcheson
 Southwest Texas State University
 It is commonplace, among philosophers acquainted with Husserl's works,
 to speak of the distinction between "solipsistic" and "intersubjective"
 phenomenology. Indeed, Husserl himself writes of phenomenology in these
 terms. Sometimes discussion of this distinction is within the context of
 criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology. It has been said, for example, that
 Husserl does not (or cannot) make the transition from the solipsistic to the
 intersubjective stage of phenomenology, since he fails to answer the problem
 of intersubjectivity. I intend to argue that the distinction between the
 solipsistic and intersubjective stages of phenomenology is at best misleading
 and, at worst, simply mistaken. Paradoxically, I shall argue that this is so on
 Husserlian grounds. I shall defend one of Husserl's depictions of
 phenomenology against some of his critics by showing that other things he
 says about it are false.
 1. Let us begin with Husserl's two attempts to draw the distinction, only
 thereafter turning to other attempts. Husserl notes that a phenomenologist
 must begin by (in part) "parenthesizing" the distinction between his or her ego
 and other egos, adding that this involves, apparently, a commitment to
 solipsism, "albeit a transcendental solipsism." Lest one think that Husserl
 thinks that the adverb "apparently" means that there is no commitment to
 "solipsism," one should note Husserl's works in the next paragraph.
 As beginning philosophers we must not let ourselves be frightened by such considerations.
 Perhaps reduction to the transcendental ego only seems to entail a permanently solipistic
 science; whereas the consequential elaboration of this science... leads over to a
 phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity.... As a matter of fact... a
 transcendental solipsism is only a subordinate stage philosophically; though, as such, it
 must first be delimited for purposes of method, in order that the problems of
 transcendental intersubjectivity, as problems belonging to a higher level, may be correctly
 stated and attacked.2
 'I read an earlier version of this paper at the annual meeting ofthe Society for Phenomenology
 and Existential Philosophy on November 1, 1979.
 2Edmund Husserl. Cartesian meditations (Dorion Cairns, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus
 Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 30-31.
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 Husserl is suggesting that the reduction to the transcendental ego does not
 entail a permanently solipsistic science. However, he regards it as entailing a
 temporary solipsistic science, a stage of phenomenology that Husserl hopes to
 overcome. But what is solipsistic science? How does it differ from a
 phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity?
 Solipsism can be classified in two categories, metaphysical and
 epistemological. Metaphysical solipsism is the thesis that only 1 and my ideas
 exist, whereas epistemological solipsism is the thesis that it is impossible to
 prove that metaphysical solipsism is false. An epistemological solipsist
 maintains that he is the only mind of whose existence he has any knowledge.
 A solipsistic science, then, would seem to be a science in which one of the
 theses is (provisionally, at least) that either epistemological or metaphysical
 solipsism is true. A metaphysical solipsistic science that is temporary would
 be odd indeed, since it would involve asserting and later denying one and the
 same thesis. Epistemological solipsism of the'provisional variety does not
 encounter this particular difficulty, provided it is construed as the thesis that
 the philosopher does not know (at a given time) how to prove that there are
 other minds. Otherwise epistemological solipsism of a temporary variety
 would include the contradictory theses that it is both possible (since we
 anticipate the proof) and impossible to prove that there are other minds.
 Thus, either the notion ofa temporary solipsistic science is self-contradictory,
 or there must be some modification of the meaning of "solipsism." The
 necessity of modifying the meaning of "solipsism" is our first indication that
 the distinction between solipsistic and intersubjective phenomenology is
 misleading.
 It may be objected that Husserl wrote of transcendental solipsism, rather
 than what we ordinarily understand by "solipsism." This objection presents
 no particular difficulties. One can simply substitute "transcendental ego" for
 "mind." A temporary transcendental solipsistic science, then, would be a
 science in which (if it is consistent) one of the theses is that the philosopher
 does not know how, at the given time, to prove that there are other
 transcendental egos.
 Although that is an odd proposition to include among the constituent
 claims of a science, my interpretation ofa consistent transcendental solipsism
 conforms to what Husserl says about it within the context. "But, at this point
 in our meditations, we can make no definite decision about this matter
 [whether the solipsism is temporary or permanent]; nor can the advance
 indications given here reveal their full significance before we have carried our
 meditations further" (Husserl, 1973, p. 31). This remark follows Husserl's
 repeated insistence, in the first meditation, that the phenomenological
 reduction requires abstaining from any preconceived notions about the form
 that one's philosophy will take. Evidently that is part of what Husserl took (at
 the time, at least) "presuppositionlessness" to mean.
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 By contrast, the intersubjective stage is the point at which one knows how
 to solve the problem and does so. Again, this interpretation fits well with the
 text.
 And yet it is quite impossible to foresee how, for me in the attitude of reduction, other
 egos?not as mere worldly phenomena but as other transcendental egos can become
 positable as existing and thus become equally legitimate themes of a phenomenological
 egology. (Husserl, 1973, p. 30, emphasis mine)
 But this way of striking the distinction is misleading. Let us see why.
 If it were legitimate to draw the distinction between solipsistic and
 intersubjective phenomenology in the way sketched above, then it would be a
 foregone conclusion that phenomenology is a permanently solipsistic science.
 For Husserl does not solve, nor attempt to solve, the problem of other minds
 in the fifth meditation or his other works. I have argued for this position more
 extensively elsewhere.3 A brief summary will suffice here. Despite the
 misleading passages cited above, as well as other passages at the beginning of
 the fifth meditation, Husserl shows that he understood quite well that the
 problem of intersubjectivity had nothing to do with the existence (or non
 existence) of other transcendental egos at the end of Cartesian Meditations.
 At no point was the transcendental attitude, the attitude of transcendental epoch?,
 abandoned; and our "theory"of experiencing someone else, our "theory"of experiencing
 others, did not aim at being and was not at liberty to be anything but explication of the
 sense, "others," as it arises from the constitutive productivity ofthat experiencing: the
 sense, "truly existing others," as it arises from the corresponding harmonious syntheses.
 (Husserl, 1973, p. 148, emphases mine)
 One should not be misled by the fact that Husserl says "truly existing others,"
 since he is talking about a sense, rather than existing others. Husserl's use of
 mention quotes around "truly existing others" is not accidental. Elsewhere
 Husserl explicitly says that he cannot assert that others exist (Husserl, 1973,
 p. 52n). This holds, incidentally for denials that others exist as well.
 Why is this so? Shouldn't we simply dismiss Husserlian phenomenology as
 solipsistic, as incapable of solving an important philosophical problem? I do
 not think so, and shall presently show why.
 The reason why Husserl cannot assert the existence (or the non-existence)
 of other subjects, transcendental or otherwise, is that phenomenological
 reduction?the methodological device with which Husserl begins
 philosophical analysis?requires (in part) neutrality on existential questions.
 A minor consequence of this point is that Husserl must remain neutral with
 regard to the existence of other subjects.
 -?
 3Husserl's problem of intersubjectivity, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
1980, 11, (2), pp. 144-162, especially pp. 145-150.
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 This prohibition against using or asserting anything about the existence of
 others does not prevent Husserl from talking about what he (or anyone) takes
 to be evidence of their existence. With regard to other subjects, Husserl wants
 to clarify what we take to be sufficient reason for believing that there are other
 subjects. That is why Husserl can speak of the sense "truly existing others,"
 but not truly existing others. Indeed, if "conceptual analysis" is construed
 sufficiently broadly, then Husserl's phenomenology is a kind of conceptual
 analysis. I say "sufficiently broadly," since intensions are not, for Husserl,
 primarily linguistic, though they are secondarily so. That is a peculiarity of
 Husserl's theory of meaning that need not concern us here. It is a kind of
 conceptual analysis, since Husserl tries to clarify the way we conceive the
 world and things in it. In this respect, Husserl's philosophy bears some
 resemblance to some forms of recent Anglo-American philosophy.
 We are now in a position to respond to the question about the worth of
 Husserl's philosophy. No, we should not dismiss Husserl's phenomenology
 on the grounds that it cannot offer a solution to the problem of other minds,
 since that is not the point of Husserl's analyses. It is as if one criticized a
 philosopher who devoted a work to the clarification of religious discourse for
 not arguing for the existence (or non-existence) of God.
 The upshot of this argument is that since phenomenological reduction
 requires neutrality on existential questions, it is misleading to suggest that
 "solipsistic" phenomenology can be distinguished from the intersubjective
 variety along existential lines.
 It is fair to object that the passages I have been citing were deleted. Indeed,
 in both the German text and English translation, one finds notes indicating
 that this is so. The very reasons that I have presented are, perhaps, the
 explanation for the fact that Husserl (presumably) deleted them. Perhaps this
 only shows that Husserl understood his enterprise better than some of his
 critics, who complain that Husserl cannot escape solipsism, as if the reduction
 committed him to it.4
 Unfortunately, that is not the only place in which Husserl suggests that the
 distinction between "solipsistic" and "intersubjective" phenomenology is to
 be drawn in terms of the existence of other (transcendental) subjects.
 Consider the following passage, which includes both of Husserl's principles
 for distinguishing between solipsistic and intersubjective phenomenology.
 What about the logic that furnishes norms for the transcendental investigations that
 clarify positive logic? One conceives concepts, one forms judgments, drawing them from
 4Paul Ricoeur. Husserl: An analysis of his phenomenology (E. Ballard and L. Embree,
 Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967, pp. 116, 130. Jean-Paul Sartre. Being
 and nothingness, (Hazel Barnes, Trans.). New York: Washington Square Press, 1953, p. 318.
 Stephan Strasser. The idea of a dialogal phenomenology. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
 Press, 1969, p. 19.
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 transcendental experience... ; one has empty and fulfilled judgments, one strives for
 truths and attains them by adequation, one deduces too, and it may well be permissible to
 proceed inductively: What about truth and principles of logic there, where true being is
 "merely subjective"? Truth, at least in the province of the most fundamental?the "purely
 egologicar? phenomenology... is no longer "truth in itself in any normal sense, not
 even in a sense that has relation to a transcendental "everyone". To make this statement
 understandable I may mention again that other subjects, as transcendental, are not given,
 within the bounds of my ego, in the manner in which my ego itself is given for me, in
 actually immediate experience, and that, at its first and fundamental level, the systematic
 structure of a transcendental phenomenology is free to lay claim to other egos solely as
 parenthesized? as "phenomena", and not yet as transcendental actualities. Thus, at this
 fundamental level, a remarkable transcendental discipline arises as the intrinsically first
 transcendental discipline, one that is actually transcendental-solipsistic: with eidetic
 truths, with theories, that hold good exclusively for me, the ego?that is to say: truths and
 theories that can rightfully claim to hold good "oncefor all" but without relation to actual
 or possible other egos.5
 Again Husserl maintains that the existence of transcendental subjects
 is a principle for distinguishing between solipsistic and inter subjective
 phenomenology. Other transcendental subjects figure only as phenomena at
 the "solipsistic" level of phenomenology, whereas one is free to claim that they
 are transcendental actualities at the intersubjective stage. But if this were true,
 then the intersubjective stage would amount to disregarding the
 phenomenological reduction; and if, as Husserl insists, the reduction must
 remain in force in order for one's analyses to be phenomenological, the
 "intersubjective stage of phenomenology*' is not phenomenology at all This
 criterion for distinguishing between solipsistic and intersubjective
 phenomenology, then, will not do. If there is any means for striking the
 distinction, it will have to be along other lines.
 2. Another suggested criterion is contained in the long passage just cited.
 Husserl says that truth is not truth in the sense that has relation to a
 transcendental everyone. At first this seems to be a straightforward
 consequence of the first criterion. Truth has no relation to a transcendental
 everyone at the solipsistic level because at that point one considers other
 subjects only as phenomena. Only at the intersubjective stage does one assert
 that other (transcendental) subjects are "actualities," and thus subjects to
 which phenomenological truths stand in a certain relation. If this were the
 only way to interpret the passage, then the suggestion would be objectionable
 for the same reason as Husserl's first criterion.
 But Husserl says more. It is noteworthy that at the end of the passage
 Husserl says that the truths of solipsistic phenomenology are true without
 relation to actual or possible other egos. He asserts this elsewhere. "It should
 be noted that, in the transition from my ego to an ego as such, neither the
 5Edmund Husserl. Formal and transcendental logic. (Dorian Cairns, Trans.). The Hague:
 Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, pp. 269-70, emphases added and deleted.
This content downloaded from 147.26.11.80 on Wed, 24 May 2017 21:44:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 170  HUTCHESON
 actuality nor the possibility of other egos is presupposed" (Husserl, 1973, p.
 72, emphasis mine). This suggestion is altogether different from the criterion
 considered above. Now we are supposed to distinguish between solipsistic
 and intersubjective phenomenology along different lines. At the solipsistic
 stage truths are "without relation" to possible other subjects; and the
 possibility of other subjects is not presupposed. By contrast, the
 intersubjective stage includes the use ofthe presupposition ofthe possibility
 of other subjects, and truths at this stage do stand "in relation" to other
 possible subjects.6
 Now this second suggestion is not subject to the criticism I made earlier.
 Phenomenological reduction requires that one remain neutral regarding the
 actual existence of other subjects. But that is a far cry from requiring
 neutrality with respect to impossible existence of other subjects. This second
 criterion, however, is subject to another criticism. Although there are a couple
 of ambiguous expressions in the passages I have cited, I think they can be
 clarified to the extent that I can argue that there cannot be a solipsistic stage of
 phenomenology if we accept Husserl's second criterion.
 The two expressions that need to be discussed are "other ego" and "without
 relation." David Carr has provided a clarification of "other ego" in order to
 make sense of Husserl's claim that he presupposes neither the actuality nor
 the possibility of other egos. Carr distinguishes between different and other
 egos. Briefly, a different ego is an ego that is the same in kind but numerically
 different. In treating his own consciousness as exemplary of the kind
 transcendental ego, Husserl presupposes the possibility of different egos.
 Husserl conceives of consciousness as a system of compossibilities, not all of
 which are compossible with all others. Accordingly, the concept ofa monad
 makes no sense except by reference to different possible systems.7
 An other ego, on the other hand, has a further characteristic; it is an ego
 that stands "in intentional relation" to me. That is, an other ego is an ego that
 is taken to exist and who is taken to be someone that intends, or can intend,
 me. An other ego is someone for whom one can be an intentional object. It has
 been suggested that although Husserl presupposes the possibility of different
 egos before the fifth meditation, he does not presuppose the possibility of
 other egos (Carr, 1975, p. 88).
 Carr's distinction between different and other egos enables us to make
 considerable headway in ascertaining what Husserl means by "without
 relation to other possible egos." Presumably he means, at least in part, that
 phenomenological truths at the solipsistic stage do not bear any intentional
 6Edmund Husserl. The Paris lectures. (Peter Koestenbaum, Trans.) The Hague: Martinus
 Nijhoff, 1967, pp. 11-12.
 7David Carr. Phenomenology and the problem of history. Evanston: Northwestern
 University Press, 1974, pp. 87-88.
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 relations to other possible subjects. That is to say, phenomenological theses at
 the solipsistic stage are true, despite the fact that it is not necessarily true that
 other possible subjects can intend them. Only at the intersubjective stage of
 phenomenology does the concept of other transcendental subjects come into
 play.
 I suggest that there cannot be a stage of phenomenology in which the
 concept of other subjects is not an operative concept. For to identify a
 proposition as true is necessarily to identify it as having a characteristic
 identifiable by anyone; Husserl, of course, identifies some propositions as
 true at the "solipsistic" stage of phenomenology.
 Let us clarify this. Husserl himself offers us a clue in one of the many
 passages on truth and evidence in Formal and Transcendental Logic.
 These, when actualized, are the unqualified truths as themselves given; cognitional
 acquisitions, abiding from then on, capable of again becoming accessible to insight at any
 time, and accessible in this manner to everyone as a rationally thinking subject, even as
 they were before their "discovery". Every "scientific statement" has this sense from the
 start. It is already addressed to this "everyone" and states what the substrate-objectivities
 are in truth?as everyone can see. (Husserl, 1969, pp. 125-26, all but first emphasis mine)
 The passage is subject to a mundane interpretation to the effect that
 scientists always presuppose that there are other scientists who can see the
 truth of what they say by consulting the evidence. If this were all that the
 passage meant, it would have no relevance to our question, since we take for
 granted that it is possible to remain philosophically neutral about the
 existence of others.
 But the passage has a significance for phenomenology, an enterprise that
 Husserl calls a science. In what sense do Husserl's scientific statements have
 the sense "there for everyone" from the start? To identify propositions as true
 is to be committed, necessarily, to two propositions: (1) it is possible that there
 are other rational subjects, and (2) these subjects can have evidential
 consciusness ofthe truth of these propositions. It is noteworthy that neither of
 these propositions include anything about the actual existence of other
 rational subjects. Only their possibility is included, such that the propositions
 in question are compatible with the non-existence of every rational subject
 but the philosopher. Imagine someone claiming that a proposition is true and
 that no one else can have access to its truth. No such proposition could be a
 constitutent of a science. Hence, there is a sense in which Husserl implicitly
 saya, at the outset of his philosophical inquiry, that "anyone can consult his
 experiences and see that what I say is true." These other possible subjects are
 rational, which is to say that certain abilities?such as the ability to recognize
 relevant evidence?are required in order to make sense of the phrase "see that
 what I say is true." One can see the truth of a proposition only if one can
 distinguish relevant from irrelevant evidence and do other things associated
 with rationality.
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 Thus, if being without relation to actual or possible other subjects is the
 criterion for being a solipsistic science, then there cannot be a solipsistic
 science. I say other subjects advisedly, since if such possible otherf can intend
 the truth of a proposition, they can be intended by and can intend me.
 Therefore, Husserl's second criterion for distinguishing between solipsistic
 and intersubjective phenomenology is at best misleading. What is more,
 passages from Husserl's works, suitably interpreted, show that the second
 criterion is awry.
 My insistence that Husserl must presuppose the possible existence of other
 subjects may not seem to be consistent with my characterization of
 phenomenology as strictly an analysis of meanings. The point can be put
 differently: Husserl has to take for granted from the outset that the meaning
 of "other transcendental rational subject" is not self-contradictory or
 countersensical, to borrow a word from Husserl. That is, the meaning cannot
 be like "round square," whose meaning is such that there cannot be a referent
 of that expression. The meaning of "other transcendental rational subject"
 must be such that there can be a referent, which is to say that there possibly
 exist other transcendental rational subjects. Questions about meaning can be
 distinguished from questions about actual existence; that is, after all, part of
 the point of the phenomenological reduction. But questions about meaning
 cannot be separated in all cases from questions about possible existence.
 Husserl himself endorses this position. In Formaland Transcendental Logic
 Husserl argues that a formal apophantics is, at the same time, a formal
 ontology. They are two sides of the same discipline, considered in different
 ways (Husserl, 1969, pp. 119-48). I have chosen the "ontological" mode of
 expression only because Husserl speaks of not presupposing the possibility of
 other subjects.
 3. Even if it is granted that one necessarily presupposes the possible
 existence of other rational subjects at the "solipsistic stage" of
 phenomenology, possible subjects who can recognize the truth of the
 scientific statements, it could still be objected that I misrepresented the
 intersubjective stage of phenomenology. Rather than being the stage at which
 one makes use of the presupposition of the possibility of other subjects,
 intersubjective phenomenology requires that the concept of other subjects has
 been clarified. If by "presupposition" we understand "an unidentified and
 unclarified assumption," then there is no presupposition of the possibility of
 other subjects in intersubjective phenomenology. Rather than being
 presupposed, the concept of other subjects is clarified, once one has reached
 the intersubjective stage of phenomenology.
 This criticism offers another criterion for distinguishing between solipsistic
 and intersubjective phenomenology. While granting as false Husserl's claim
 that he does not presuppose the possibility of other subjects, my interlocutor
 suggests that solipsistic phenomenology is to be distinguished from
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 intersubjective phenomenology on,grounds of clarification. At the solipsistic
 stage the concept of other subjects is unclarified or presupposed, whereas at
 the intersubjective stage the concept is clarified. To my knowledge, Husserl
 never invokes this as a criterion, although there are passages that invite this
 interpretation.
 But this suggestion does not provide us with a principle that justifies
 speaking of solipsistic and intersubjective phenomenology any more than
 other sorts of phenomenology. If clarification of a concept (or the lack of such
 clarification) were sufficient for categorizing different sorts of
 phenomenology, there would be a new kind of phenomenology for each
 concept that is clarified. But Husserl does not introduce, say, "physical object
 phenomenology" upon clarification of the appropriate concept, nor is the
 stage that precedes the analysis "non-physical object phenomenology." The
 suggestion does not provide us with a feature of intersubjectivity in particular,
 a feature that justifies talk of solipsistic and intersubjective phenomenology
 without, at the same time, opening the door to all other sorts of
 "ph?nom?nologies." Although this suggestion could serve as a means for
 naming what Husserl calls solipsistic and intersubjective phenomenology, it
 does not provide us with a principle that picks out the relevant feature of
 intersubjectivity. Besides, it is worth repeating that this suggesting is not in
 Husserl's works.
 It may be objected that all that is necessry to strike the distinction is a name,
 and that no principle is necessary. So, generalizing the suggestion is off the
 point. My reply is that the use of the adjective "solipsistic" and
 "intersubjective" to modify phenomenology involves commitment to two
 kinds of phenomenology. If there are two kinds, a principle is necessary
 whereby we can distinguish between the two. By arguing that attempts to
 draw the distinction are either misleading or false I am, of course, suggesting
 that there is only one kind of phenomenology, with a method and foundations
 that remain the same throughout.8
 4. Another suggestion of a criterion for distinguishing between solipsistic
 and intersubjective phenomenology is that objects are constituted solely as
 correlates of my actual and possible perspectival views of them as the
 8I am, in effect, endorsing a position that Harrison Hall has recently defended. "The
 conclusions I will be aiming for are that the 'Fifth Meditation' adds nothing to Husserl's
 phenomenology which requires either a shift in method or a re-evaluation of foundations, and
 that, in the relevant respects at least, the Crisis is perfectly continuous with the Cartesian
 Meditations. "Harrison Hall. Intersubjective phenomenology and Husserl's Cartesianism. Man
 and World 1979, 12, (1), p. 14. Yet Hall is willing to speak of solipsistic and intersubjective
 phenomenology. Hall does not trace the problem in Carr's article to an attempt to make
 something of the distinction between solipsistic and intersubjective phenomenology which, if I
 am right, cannot be done. Rightly or wrongly, I think that the terms in question strongly suggest,
 misleadingly, that there are two phenomenological methods.
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 solipsistic level, whereas they are constituted as correlates of the actual and
 possible views of a community at the intersubjective level (Hall, 1979, p. 13).
 But this suggestion does not work, since objects are constituted as the
 correlates of an open community at the solipsistic level. I continue to take
 (physical) objects to be publicly accessible from different and simultaneous
 perspectives post-phenomenological reduction. Husserl simply has not
 clarified that constitution prior to the analysis in the fifth meditation.
 Phenomenological reduction does not alter or distort the constitution of
 objects, as the criterion seems to suggest. It only allows one to become aware
 that it is taking place. Besides, truths are objects in Husserl's sense of the term,
 about which I have already commented.
 5. It has been suggested, lastly, that one takes a community, rather than
 one's individual consciousness, as one's point of departure in intersubjective
 phenomenology. I have already pointed out one respect in which a
 phenomenologist must take a community as his point of departure from the
 outset. By identifying some propositions as true, a phenomenologist is
 committing himself to the possible existence of other rational subjects who
 can recognize their truth.
 "Taking a community as one's point of departure" may, on the other hand,
 mean that one abandons the first-person point of view. But that does not
 square with Husserlian phenomenology. "Imperturbably I must hold fast to
 the insight that every sense that any existent whatever has or can have for
 me?in respect of its "what" and its "it exists and actually is"?is a sense in
 and arising from my intentional life..." (Husserl, 1973, p. 91). Although the
 truths of phenomenology are for a possible us, a Husserlian phenomenologist
 bases his claims on a descriptive analysis of his own experiences. A Husserlian
 phenomenologist, then, never abandons what I have called "the first-person
 standpoint." Thus, the suggestion does not offer a principle for distinguishing
 between solipsistic and intersubjective^phenomenology.
 To sum up, Husserl's two principles do not permit us to distinguish between
 solipsistic and intersubjective phenomenology. The three other suggestions I
 have considered also fail to provide us with a principle for distinguishing
 between the "two sorts" of phenomenology. The distinction, if there is one,
 has not been adequately clarified.
 What are the philosophical consequences of these criticisms of Husserl's
 proposals for distinguishing between solipsistic and intersubjective
 phenomenology? I think that there are two.
 First, some commentators have misinterpreted Husserl's project in the fifth
 meditation and elsewhere. Perhaps they take their cue from Husserl's
 misleading remarks about the distinction between solipsistic and
 intersubjective phenomenology.9 Now that we see that the distinction cannot
 9I have in mind those commentators I mentioned in footnote 4, among others. Since Ricoeur is
 correct in observing that solipsism has always been an objection to idealistic philosophies, I also
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 be drawn along the lines I have considered, we not only have a better
 understanding of Husserl's works, but of the problem of intersubjectivity as
 well.
 The second point is more difficult to explain, but is more important. If is it
 granted that a phenomenologist must presuppose the possibility of other
 egos, an objection that could be raised against a Husserlian solution to the
 problem can be blocked. Explaining the objection requires clarification ofthe
 concept of transcendence, which plays an important role in Husserl's writings
 on intersubjectivity.
 David Carr has distinguished between transcendence in the weak sense and
 transcendence in the strong sense. The weak sense of "transcendence" means
 "not reducible to one's actual acts of consciousness" (hereafter:
 transcendence 1). Something transcends i my consciousness if it retains its
 identity throughout my actual acts. This sheet of paper transcends i my
 consciousness, insofar as it is the same sheet of paper that I see now, could see
 later, remember, or think about. This sheet of paper also transcends my
 consciousness in the strong sense (hereafter: transcends2). That is to say, it is
 not reducible to my possible acts. I see only one side of this sheet of paper; yet
 it is the same sheet of paper, the other side of which can be seen at the same
 time. Since it is impossible for me to see the other side while simultaneously
 seeing this side alone, this sheet of paper transcends2 my consciousness.
 Truths also transcend my acts in this way, since they are the same truths that
 can be intended (entertained, insightfully thought about, etc.) at the same
 time that I do not intend them. I hope it is clear that one can account for
 transcendence2 only by reference to another possible subject. Only another
 subject can see the other side of this sheet of paper at the same time that 1 do
 not. As commentators have recognized, Husserl tries to give clarification of
 transcendence2 in his writings on intersubjectivity, thereby hoping to clarify
 the related concept of objectivity.
 Now, let us suppose that Husserl does not presuppose the possibility of
 other subjects. In that case, Husserl could (at most) account only for the
 transcendencei of the alter ego. David Carr recognizes this in his
 have in mind those commentators who interpret Husserl's philosophy as a kind of idealism that is
 opposed to realism. Roman Ingarden is probably the leading proponent of the idealistic
 interpretation. Cf. Roman Ingarden, On the motives which led Husserl to transcendental
 idealism. (A. Hannibalsson, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975. There are some
 philosophers who have adopted Ingarden's interpretation. Others take Husserl to bean idealist,
 although I have no reason to believe that they adopted it from Ingarden. These include Peter
 Koestenbaum (Husserl, 1967, pp. LX-LXI), William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian
 (introduction to their translation of Husserl's The idea of phenomenology, pp. xvii-xx). Richard
 Holmes has noted that there are other commentators who think that Husserl is an idealist in Is
 transcendental phenomenology committed to idealism?, Monist (January, 1975, 59 (1), pp.
 98-114. Proponents of the idealistic readings of Husserl are inclined to take Husserl to be a
 solipsist and to take his writings on intersubjectivity as an attempt to solve the problem of other
 minds.
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 interpretation of the fifth meditation. "What must be understood about this
 whole account is that, while the alter ego makes it possible that the 'rest' of the
 world exceeds my actual and possible consciousness, the alter ego does not
 himself exceed my actual and possible consciousness" (Carr, 1974, p. 97).
 But can the alter ego make it possible for the rest of the world to transcend2
 my consciousness if he only transcends] mine? In order to make the
 transcendence2 of "everything else" possible, the alter ego must be someone
 for whom the world is "there too." And if I identify the alter ego as someone
 who constitutes the world along with me, 1 have thereby identified things as
 being for him, even if he is not for me, actually or possibly. My death would
 'amount to the cessation of my actual and possible consciousness; yet that can
 be true while things continue to be for another constituting subject. To
 identify someone as another constituting subject is to identify him as existing
 independently; and to take someone to exist independently is to be committed
 to his transcendence2. If it were possible for public objects to be for another
 subject that merely transcends i my consciousness, then it would be possible
 for me to see the other side of this sheet of paper while 1 do not see it. The
 reason is that transcendence! is explained by reference to my possible acts; an
 object is not reducible to my actual acts only because it can be the referent of a
 possible one. Now another subject is someone who can see the opposite side of
 this sheet of paper simultaneously. If the other subject merely transcends i my
 consciousness, then any possible act of his is one of my possible acts. Thus,
 since the other subject can see the opposite side of this sheet of paper at the
 same time I do not, it would be possible for me to do so. Clearly, that is not
 possible. Thus, another subject must be identified as transcending2 one's
 consciousness. In short, Husserl cannot fully clarify the sense "other
 constituting subject" or the related concept of objectivity, if he can clarify
 only the transcendence] of the other subject. The only way Husserl (or any
 Husserlian phenomenologist) can account for the possibility of the other
 subject's transcendence2 is by making use of the concept of other subjects,
 who can co-constitute the transcendence2 of the other subject that is the theme
 of the analysis.
 Thus, if one thinks Husserl's claim that he does not presuppose the
 possibility of other subjects is false, one can respond to an objection to a
 Husserlian analysis of intersubjectivity. This is not even to mention the
 objections concerning the concept of truth, which can also be avoided. This
 suggestion for avoiding some difficulties also provides a sense for the
 expression "the primacy of intersubjectivity." Intersubjectivity is primary in
 the sense that one cannot make sense of one's philosophy as consisting of a
 body of truths, nor can one clarify the concept of another subject fully, unless
 one supposes the possibility of other subjects.
 This line has a difficulty of its own. It is fair to object that this renders the
 analysis of the sense "other subject" circular. The analysis is supposed to yield
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 the clarification of the concept of another subject. Yet is has been argued that
 the concept must be presupposed. A first response is that it is not circular in
 the same way that an argument is. For although there are arguments in
 Husserl's writings on intersubjectivity (or, more properly, Husserlian
 writings, since we have abandoned Husserl's line), the overall structure of
 such an analysis is not an argument. Rather, it is a clarification of a sense. So
 the "circularity," if there is any, is much more like a circular definition, a
 definition that is uninformative because it uses the term (or a synonym) to be
 defined.
 This difficulty, I think, can be resolved by pointing to the distinction
 between a clarified and an unclarified concept. One need not presuppose that
 the concept of another subject is already clarified at the outset. It is necessary
 to take for granted only a pre-philosophical understanding, which the
 analysis is supposed to transform into philosophical clarity. That is, in part,
 what I have done by identifying the necessity of the presupposition. This
 suggestion is close to, if not identical with, Heidegger's remarks in Being and
 Time.
 It is fair to object with the following challenge: If the fifth meditation (or
 Husserl's other writings on intersubjectivity) do not initiate a shift from
 solipsistic to inter subjective phenomenology, then what is Husserl doing? My
 reply is simple. Husserl is merely trying to clarify something that has been
 implicit in his philosophy all along, the sense "other transcendental rational
 subject." As I said, there is but one kind of (Husserlian) phenomenology.
 One last objection should be considered. Husserl does not use the terms
 "solipsistic phenomenology" and "intersubjective phenomenology"
 frequently, preferring instead to use the term "purely egological
 phenomenology." Even in passages where he is discussing the problem of
 intersubjectivity, Huserl sometimes uses the term "purely egological
 phenomenology" rather than "solipsistic phenomenology." It is true that
 "purely egological phenomenology" does not suggest that the problem of
 intersubjectivity is the problem of proving that there are other transcendental
 egos. But it does suggest, misleadingly, that there are two kinds of
 phenomenology, insofar as Husserl uses the term as a synonym for "solipsistic
 phenomenology." Since this is so, Husserl is subject to the challenge "What
 is the principle whereby one can distinguish between purely egological
 phenomenology and the other kind of phenomenology?" I do not think that it
 is accidental that there is no term, paired with "purely egological
 phenomenology," as there is for "solipsistic phenomenology." I suggest that
 the explanation is that there is no other kind, at least no kind that can be
 distinguished with a principle, rather than simply named. This paper, then,
 should be considered as a criticism of the misleading overtones of "purely
 egological phenomenology" as well. Although some sciences are classified in
 terms of their subject matters, the subject matter of "purely egological
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 phenomenology" is not sufficiently different from "intersubjective
 phenomenology" to justify talk of two different ph?nom?nologies. For
 Husserl's distinctive method is the same in "intersubjective" phenomenology,
 and the subject matter is fundamentally the same, too. "Other subject" is one
 noema among others.10
 The thesis of this paper is independent of the particulars of any of Husserl's
 analyses. I sought only to clear the way for a Husserlian solution to the
 problem of intersubjectivity by exposing some unjust criticisms and arguing
 that Husserl was ill-advised to use the terminology I have discussed.
 10Although my quotations from Husserl's writings on intersubjectivity has been selective, I do
 not think that Husserl's Nachlass is (at least prima facie) as worthy ofthe claim to be Husserl's
 official position as the works that Husserl had published during his lifetime. Moreover, evidence
 suggests that Husserl thoroughly approved of Formal and transcendental logic, from which the
 central quotation in this paper comes. Likewise, Husserl's vacillation about the distinction
 between solipsistic and intersubjective phenomenology does not militate against the fact that, in
 most ofthe passages I have cited, Husserl said false or misleading things about phenomenology.
 Besides, I have argued that Husserl vacillated between statements that imply that his remarks
 about solipsistic and intesubjective phenomenology are false or misleading, and those false or
 misleading statements themselves. Hence I have not suggested that Husserl's position on this
 matter is unchanging. I am suggesting, rather, a different terminology, one that is free from
 misleading overtones. Lastly, I am only secondarily concerned with Husserl's position. My
 primary concern is to defend what I consider to be a proper understanding of phenomenology,
 and to correct the host of commentators who may have been misled by some of Husserl's
 statements.
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